15/09/2014

Guest contribution by Osman Bahadir Dinçer

(Originally published on Security and Defence Agenda).

The Mesopotamian basin, namely Iraq and Syria, is descending into an increasingly complex and chaotic period. Only by understanding how it has come to this point can we try to find more viable policy options. Ascribing the roots of the problem solely to the organisation known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will likely fail to produce correct solutions.

 

 

 

The government deadlock in Iraq, Iraq’s outgoing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s alienating policies, sectarian conflict, lack of vision by local religious and political actors, the shift from de-Ba’athification to de-Sunnification, involvement of regional power proxies, all indicate that an ISIS- type organization would have emerged in any case.

 

 

 

Is ISIS likely to disappear soon or how must it be stopped? Any answer to this question must be comprehensive. Every local, regional and global actor has a role to play. Some important regional grievances and diseases must be solved to stop not only ISIS and similar organizations, but the ISIS spirit itself. The real task at hand is to eliminate the favourable conditions for groups such as ISIS. 

Lack of strategic vision

 

Sectarianism has often been portrayed as the main culprit but it is by no means the only one. Sunni or Shiite, even the most prudent religious and political leaders in the region lack a strategic vision. The discussion around the issue is led mostly in religious rather than political and social terms, making a short-term solution difficult. ISIS and similar radical groups take advantage of this lack of strategic vision, at the devastating expense of the people in Iraq and the region, whether Shiite or Sunni. Growth of radical factions has discouraged people from moderate approaches.

 

Local religious authorities and actors must be wary of their language and practices, and must refrain from rhetoric that increases sectarian tension.

 

The spread of proxy conflicts

 

Iraq has been a stage for proxy wars. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, always acting at opposite ends of the spectrum, have radicalised the region and triggered an arms race. Iran’s impact, not just on the Baghdad government but on different radical Shiite elements, should not be underestimated. The development of Maliki’s alliances with splinter groups of radical predisposition rather than with mainstream, moderate, and centrist groups has resulted in a central government less inclined to compromise.

Iraq must gain back the foreground and work for its interests rather than that of regional and global actors.

 

Conjectural alliance with local actors

 

There is a multitude of armed groups operating in the field, and  ISIS is not behind every action in Iraq. Having transformed people’s desperation and the lack of authority into an opportunity, these groups have reached a previously unattained position of influence and power. Nonetheless, disgruntled people who struggle against the central government should distance themselves unequivocally from ISIS and other terrorist organisations. Iraq must denounce all acts of terrorism no matter who employs it.

 

It is also important, of course, to address grievances. No matter how justified they think they are, people ought to refrain from sponsoring such groups and looking to them for aid.

 

Inclusive approach needed

 

It will not be enough for incoming Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Ibadi to form a new government that features Sunnis. Maliki leaving is in itself an important step; but what is needed is an all-out transformation of the social paradigm. It will not be easy to overcome the othering rhetoric, entrenched over decades, neither will it be easy to reinstate an approach based on dialogue and commonsense. The political inclusion of Sunnis is only one of the prerequisites to upholding the integrity of Iraq

 

It will be difficult to eliminate the ISIS spirit, and cannot be done solely through the initiative of one or two actors. We face a long process, but certain concrete actions can be implemented urgently.

 

1. Breakdown the ISIS propaganda machine

 

The perception of ISIS’s current military capacity is exaggerated. ISIS’s success and rapid territorial expansion can be attributed to a virtual lack of an Iraqi army and powerless opponents. Their operations focus on minorities and other unprotected groups like the Turkmen and Yazidis. ISIS is therefore perceived to be extremely powerful, and has proven very good at creating and sustaining this image. ISIS has pursued very effective propaganda strategies. Its involvement in Syria and Iraq is one of the most publicized military actions in the world. Foreign fighters, especially Westerners, broadcast the ISIS message in different languages. This linguistic advantage gives ISIS an unprecedented upper hand over the other armed groups operating in Iraq and Syria. It not only enables it to recruit more people, but also allows it to access more money and ammunition and to draw worldwide attention. 

2. New recruits should be prevented

 

ISIS counts a large number of non-Syrian and non-Iraqi fighters. These fighters’ countries of origin, Turkey in the lead, should act together to take the necessary precautions to prevent new recruits. Border crossings should be monitoring more closely and intelligence activities should be increased. More must be done to damage ISIS’s financial resources.

3. Religious leaders and local actors must voice their dissent

 

If relative stability can be achieved after Maliki, different actors may come together against ISIS. Sunni revolutionary organisations that prioritized Maliki's resignation will feel especially relieved. If such Sunni groups can act, they will draw the attention of other groups and reduce ISIS’s power as a result. This is however still a very optimistic scenario. If tribal councils and religious authorities condemn ISIS’s violent methods and fill the gap, Iraq may no longer be a safe place for ISIS. 


Who should not stop ISIS?

 

ISIS cannot be stopped solely by military means. Neither is it prudent to forge alliances with and rely on the PKK and the PYD - themselves terrorist organizations - to do the fighting. International attention on the PKK and PYD and their perception as legitimate actors could have very grave consequences. A terrorist group cannot be fought with the help of another terrorist group. Modern history of Middle East including the case of Afghanistan is full of such instances.

 

 

 

Eliminating the ISIS spirit is no easy task and it seems highly unlikely that ISIS will be stopped completely while the lack of a strategic vision persists in the Islamic world, Iran and Gulf countries are this covetous, local actors are this desperate, Turkey is this incapacitated and the USA and Western actors are this focused on their own self-interests. A collective and comprehensive international political approach is in order, with a coordinated effort involving, political, financial as well as military means. The treatment will no doubt have to be a long, tiring, painful and testing process.


Osman Bahadır Dinçer is a Researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK). His area of expertise includes the Middle East with particular reference to social and political movements, political development and democratisation. He is also Co-author of recent USAK report, Increasing Violence and Deepening Divisions: Rise of Radical Groups and Iraq’s Uncertain Future.


This topic and other issues of global security will be discussed during the Security Jam 2014. Jam with us on 14-16. Find out more here.